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Defining Work Equipment
Thompsons Personal Injury Solicitors welcome the decision in the recent House of Lords case Spencer-Franks v Kellogg Brown & Root Ltd and others. The decision provides clarity on what is deemed to be work equipment within the terms of the Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1998. The decision makes it easier for victims of injuries at work to make compensation claims against their employers for defective work equipment.
This case involves a recent House of Lords decision that reversed the decision of the Appeal Courts Judges in Scotland. In 2003, Mr Spencer-Franks was employed as a mechanical technician by the first respondent (KBR), a multi-national company based in Texas which, among other things, supplied services to the offshore oil industry. KBR contracted to supply workers to operate the Tartan Alpha platform in the Scottish sector of the North Sea, which was operated by the second respondent, Talisman Energy (UK) Ltd (Talisman), a subsidiary of a Canadian oil company. Mr Spencer Franks was one of the workers which KBR supplied to work on the platform. In October 2003, the closer on the door of the central control room was not working properly, and Mr Spencer Franks was asked to inspect and repair it. While repairing the door closer the screw in the linkage arm was disengaged in circumstances in which it should not have been, and he suffered injury as a result. He made a compensation claim in Scotland, claiming that the respondents had each been in breach of its obligations under the Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1998, which replaced the Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1992 both having been passed in order to implement Council Directive (EEC) 89/655 (the equipment directive). He contended that the door closer was 'work equipment' for the purposes of reg 2(1) of the equipment regulations, being a piece of machinery or apparatus for use at work. He further contended that it was not suitable for use in a way which would foreseeably affect his safety; it was attached in such a way that the arm would fly off unexpectedly and hit one in the face. The sheriff sustained the plea of KBR on the ground that although the door closer was 'work equipment', the employer had no control over it and the regulations therefore did not impose responsibility upon it. On the other hand, Talisman, the operator, did have control. Both Mr Spencer-Franks and Talisman appealed. The Court of Session held that the door closer was not 'work equipment', and even if it was, he had not been 'using' it within the meaning of the regulations. The Court of Session accordingly dismissed the Mr Spencer-Franks appeal. He appealed to the House of Lords. Counsel for the respondents agreed that if Talisman was liable to the him, KBR would be also.
The House of Lords allowed the appeal, stating that the equipment regulations required the purpose of the apparatus in question to be ascertained. If it was for use at work, then it was work equipment. For the purposes of identifying something as work equipment, one should consider whether it was for use, in the sense that it performed a useful, practical function within and in relation to the purposes of the business. A lathe used in a repair shop would perform such a function, but a customer's item being repaired in the shop was the merely passive object of the purposes of the repair workshop. The equipment regulations were intended to implement the equipment directive. The wording 'for use at work' was presumably incorporated to forestall literalist arguments that because a piece of machinery was not actually being used when injury was caused, it was not work equipment. The door closer at issue in the instant case was clearly 'work equipment'; everyone using the control room was using it for the purposes of their work, to enter and leave the control room. In the instant case, the fact that the door formed part of the structure did not render it outwith the definition of 'work equipment'. Mr Spencer-Franks had accordingly been 'using' the door closer when he had been repairing it.
If you or someone you love has been involved in an accident please call our No Win No Fee lawyers FREE on 08000 89 13 31 and we can advise you on your first step towards receiving compensation or fill out the form below.
This case involves a recent House of Lords decision that reversed the decision of the Appeal Courts Judges in Scotland. In 2003, Mr Spencer-Franks was employed as a mechanical technician by the first respondent (KBR), a multi-national company based in Texas which, among other things, supplied services to the offshore oil industry. KBR contracted to supply workers to operate the Tartan Alpha platform in the Scottish sector of the North Sea, which was operated by the second respondent, Talisman Energy (UK) Ltd (Talisman), a subsidiary of a Canadian oil company. Mr Spencer Franks was one of the workers which KBR supplied to work on the platform. In October 2003, the closer on the door of the central control room was not working properly, and Mr Spencer Franks was asked to inspect and repair it. While repairing the door closer the screw in the linkage arm was disengaged in circumstances in which it should not have been, and he suffered injury as a result. He made a compensation claim in Scotland, claiming that the respondents had each been in breach of its obligations under the Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1998, which replaced the Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1992 both having been passed in order to implement Council Directive (EEC) 89/655 (the equipment directive). He contended that the door closer was 'work equipment' for the purposes of reg 2(1) of the equipment regulations, being a piece of machinery or apparatus for use at work. He further contended that it was not suitable for use in a way which would foreseeably affect his safety; it was attached in such a way that the arm would fly off unexpectedly and hit one in the face. The sheriff sustained the plea of KBR on the ground that although the door closer was 'work equipment', the employer had no control over it and the regulations therefore did not impose responsibility upon it. On the other hand, Talisman, the operator, did have control. Both Mr Spencer-Franks and Talisman appealed. The Court of Session held that the door closer was not 'work equipment', and even if it was, he had not been 'using' it within the meaning of the regulations. The Court of Session accordingly dismissed the Mr Spencer-Franks appeal. He appealed to the House of Lords. Counsel for the respondents agreed that if Talisman was liable to the him, KBR would be also.
The House of Lords allowed the appeal, stating that the equipment regulations required the purpose of the apparatus in question to be ascertained. If it was for use at work, then it was work equipment. For the purposes of identifying something as work equipment, one should consider whether it was for use, in the sense that it performed a useful, practical function within and in relation to the purposes of the business. A lathe used in a repair shop would perform such a function, but a customer's item being repaired in the shop was the merely passive object of the purposes of the repair workshop. The equipment regulations were intended to implement the equipment directive. The wording 'for use at work' was presumably incorporated to forestall literalist arguments that because a piece of machinery was not actually being used when injury was caused, it was not work equipment. The door closer at issue in the instant case was clearly 'work equipment'; everyone using the control room was using it for the purposes of their work, to enter and leave the control room. In the instant case, the fact that the door formed part of the structure did not render it outwith the definition of 'work equipment'. Mr Spencer-Franks had accordingly been 'using' the door closer when he had been repairing it.
If you or someone you love has been involved in an accident please call our No Win No Fee lawyers FREE on 08000 89 13 31 and we can advise you on your first step towards receiving compensation or fill out the form below.